Dr. San Martín-Mosqueira, Pablo

In this paper we analyse the relationship between the investment of Pension Fund Managers (AFPs) and the cost of corporate debt (public and private). Using a sample of 93 non-financial Chilean listed firms between 2009 and 2014, we find that AFPs increase the probability of issuing bonds. Moreover, in line with our crowding out hypothesis, we show that AFPs increase the cost of bank borrowing. In line with the monitoring view, we find that AFPs decrease bond yields. On average, our results suggest that AFPs improve corporate governance by influencing information disclosure and by reducing the intensity of lending relationships with banks.

Using a sample of 595 firms listed in the capital markets of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru for the period of 2000---2015, we confirm prior literature by showing that when power distribution among several large shareholders (contestability) increases, firms’ financial performance is enhanced. More interestingly, we find that these relations are even more significant in family-owned firms, emphasising the relevance of contesting control in this kind of firm. Furthermore, contestability has a greater influence in family firms that have the most concentrated ownership. We also find that the legal framework attenuates the impact of the balance of ownership. Here, contesting control acts as an internal corporate governance mechanism that provides an alternative to the external legal setting. Taken together, our results mean that in institutional settings characterised by weak investor protection and possible conflicts of interest among shareholders, oversight by multiple large, non-related shareholders (balanced ownership concentration) becomes an important governance mechanism.