Dr. San Martín-Mosqueira, Pablo

This study analyzes the zero-debt decisions of BRICS firms using a bivariate probit model. The leading hypotheses are financial flexibility and financial constraints. On the demand-side, our findings reveal that managerial debt aversion, early lifecycle stage, growth opportunities, solvency, and concentrated ownership contribute to the lack of debt. Similarly, a country's institutional quality correlates with firms' debt-free status. On the supply-side, creditors fund companies with poor financial records in countries with robust markets and economic freedom. Financial flexibility and restrictions leading to zero debt are linked to firm and institutional characteristics in emerging countries.

From a corporate governance point of view, this paper addresses the question of how corporate ownership and board characteristics influence firm value for a sample of Ibero-American companies. Specifically, we analyse indexed non-financial companies from Chile and Spain for the period 2007 – 2016, using the GMM panel data technique. Our research is novel in considering a two-country approach, with one emerging and one developed country, and in analysing how corporate ownership and board characteristics, in addition to contextual variables, determine firm value. Our results assess the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms. Although findings are intriguing regarding ownership concentration, they confirm the benefits of a good board of directors. This type of board is characterised by a large size, sufficiently independent directors, and a balance in terms of gender diversity. We provide several policy recommendations from our main findings.

Using a unique, hand-collected data sample and panel-data econometric techniques, we analyse the impact of founding-family control and intergenerational succession on the value of Chilean listed companies. After controlling for firm- and ownership-specific characteristics, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between a founding family’s degree of ownership and firm value. Hence, family ownership at first increases firm value. However, when family ownership exceeds a threshold of about 38 percent of outstanding shares, the family takes advantage of its power in the firm and extracts wealth from minority shareholders. Further, if the founder of the company is the CEO or chairman of the board, firm value increases. However, family businesses with a subsequent-generation owner-manager destroy value.