Dr. San Martín-Mosqueira, Pablo

Purpose: This study aims to investigate how gender diversity and remuneration of boards of directors’ influence earnings quality for Spanish-listed firms. Design/methodology/approach: The sample includes 105 nonfinancial Spanish firms from 2013 to 2018, corresponding to an unbalanced panel of 491 firm-year observations. The primary empirical method uses a Tobit semiparametric estimator with firm- and industry-level fixed effects and an innovative set of measures for earnings quality developed by StarMine. Findings: Results exhibit a positive correlation between increased gender diversity and a firm’s earnings quality, suggesting that a gender-balanced board of directors is associated with more transparent financial reporting and informative earnings. We also find a nonmonotonic, concave relationship between board remuneration and earnings quality. This indicates that beyond a certain point, excessive board compensation leads to more opportunistic manipulation of financial reporting with subsequent degradation of earnings quality. Research limitations/implications: This study only covers nonfinancial Spanish listed firms and is silent about how alternative board features’ influence earnings quality and their informativeness. Originality/value: This study introduces measures of earnings quality developed by StarMine that have not been used in the empirical literature before as well as measures of board gender diversity applied to a suitable Tobit semiparametric estimator for fixed effects that improves the precision of results. In addition, while most of the literature focuses on Anglo-Saxon countries, this study discusses board gender diversity and board remuneration in the underexplored context of Spain. Moreover, the hand-collected data set comprising financial reports provides previously untested board features as well as a nonlinear relationship between remuneration and earnings quality that has not been thoroughly discussed before.

This study analyses the impact of firm-level variables as well as country-level institutional factors on firm value in the Latin American region. The theoretical framework used to develop the research hypotheses has followed a corporate governance approach. The sample includes public firms from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru for the 1997–2013 period. The main findings indicate that ownership concentration, capital structure, and dividend policy are significant drivers of the market value of the firm. The results from determinants at the country-level show that legal enforcement and regulatory systems positively impact the market value of the firm, whilst the findings show unexpected results concerning the development of the financial system.

This study analyzes the zero-debt decisions of BRICS firms using a bivariate probit model. The leading hypotheses are financial flexibility and financial constraints. On the demand-side, our findings reveal that managerial debt aversion, early lifecycle stage, growth opportunities, solvency, and concentrated ownership contribute to the lack of debt. Similarly, a country's institutional quality correlates with firms' debt-free status. On the supply-side, creditors fund companies with poor financial records in countries with robust markets and economic freedom. Financial flexibility and restrictions leading to zero debt are linked to firm and institutional characteristics in emerging countries.

Improvements in transparency at the country level have modified the relevance of bank debt maturity as a control mechanism. The novelty of this research is that we provide empirical evidence that the maturity of bank borrowing is contingent on the characteristics of the regulatory and the institutional setting about corporate governance. The main implication of our paper is that corporate governance rules have greater influence in civil-law countries than in common-law countries in promoting efficiency in the use of bank debt maturity. The value of this paper is that our results confirm that the implementation of similar regulations on transparency across countries with different legal systems favors the alignment of the role played by short-term bank debt in addressing asymmetric information, agency costs, and inefficient liquidation.

The goal of this paper, which follows a corporate governance approach, is to assess whether within country changes in governance (e.g. in legal and regulatory systems and financial development) and changes in corporate ownership concentration can predict a change in the value of Latin American firms. Using fixed-effect panel data models with a representative sample of firms for the period from 1997 to 2013, we observe that the investors’ rights and their legal protection as well as the rule of law are associated with a premium in the firm market value. Contrary to what was expected, in immature financial markets, as found in Latin America, firms take advantage of both the asymmetries of information and the multiple market frictions to be overvalued. So, as the financial system develops, firm value drops. At the firm-level, results confirm the hypothesis of the expropriation of minority shareholders.

From a corporate governance point of view, this paper addresses the question of how corporate ownership and board characteristics influence firm value for a sample of Ibero-American companies. Specifically, we analyse indexed non-financial companies from Chile and Spain for the period 2007 – 2016, using the GMM panel data technique. Our research is novel in considering a two-country approach, with one emerging and one developed country, and in analysing how corporate ownership and board characteristics, in addition to contextual variables, determine firm value. Our results assess the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms. Although findings are intriguing regarding ownership concentration, they confirm the benefits of a good board of directors. This type of board is characterised by a large size, sufficiently independent directors, and a balance in terms of gender diversity. We provide several policy recommendations from our main findings.

From a corporate governance point of view, this paper addresses the question about how board gender diversity influences managerial opportunistic behavior for solving agency conflicts from a sample of European countries. Specifically, we analyzed indexed non-financial companies from Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom for the period 2006–2016. Several panel data techniques are used in the empirical analysis to deal with the endogeneity and heterogeneity problems. To the best of our knowledge our research is novel in the literature by providing a multi-country approach in board gender diversity, as well as considering contextual country variables and the role of the regulatory system as determinants of earnings management. Our results confirm the benefits of having a balanced board in terms of gender diversity. An equilibrated board tends to mitigate earnings management practices, reinforcing the value of the laws passed in recent decades in Europe. Our analysis reveals that the regulatory framework regarding board gender diversity established by each country has a determinant role in reaching equality in decision-making positions, as a founding value of the European Union. We provide several policy recommendations from our main findings.

Using a unique, hand-collected data sample and panel-data econometric techniques, we analyse the impact of founding-family control and intergenerational succession on the value of Chilean listed companies. After controlling for firm- and ownership-specific characteristics, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between a founding family’s degree of ownership and firm value. Hence, family ownership at first increases firm value. However, when family ownership exceeds a threshold of about 38 percent of outstanding shares, the family takes advantage of its power in the firm and extracts wealth from minority shareholders. Further, if the founder of the company is the CEO or chairman of the board, firm value increases. However, family businesses with a subsequent-generation owner-manager destroy value.

The purpose ofthis paper is to analyze the traditional drivers ofthe capital structure, in addition to others particularities ofthe Chilean corporate sector. Using panel data methodology, this study examines the potential drivers of the capital structure in a sample of 157 Chilean firms. To do that, this study also includes variables not commonly used in the literature (e.g. ownership concentration, business groups affiliation, and dividends), as distinctive elements of the Chilean corporate sector. Our results show a positive effect of firm size and ownership concentration on firms leverage; as well as a negative effect of the pay-out policy, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shields, and profitability on the leverage. Some expected relationships in theAnglo-Saxon context are also curiously observed in Chile. Nevertheless, there are some relations that are not in line with the current literature such as the negative relationship between asset tangibility and leverage. Finally, firms’ affiliation to economic groups allows them to take advantage of internal capital markets, increasing leverage. This suggests that some of the insights from the current theoretical bodies are not portable across countries, and consequently, much remains to be done in order to understand the impact of different institutional features on capital structure choices. Emerging markets provide a challenge to existing models that need to be reformulated to accommodate the characteristics of these markets. This study contributes in this direction by taking into consideration the particularities of an emerging Latin American Economy.

Using a sample of 595 firms listed in the capital markets of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru for the period of 2000---2015, we confirm prior literature by showing that when power distribution among several large shareholders (contestability) increases, firms’ financial performance is enhanced. More interestingly, we find that these relations are even more significant in family-owned firms, emphasising the relevance of contesting control in this kind of firm. Furthermore, contestability has a greater influence in family firms that have the most concentrated ownership. We also find that the legal framework attenuates the impact of the balance of ownership. Here, contesting control acts as an internal corporate governance mechanism that provides an alternative to the external legal setting. Taken together, our results mean that in institutional settings characterised by weak investor protection and possible conflicts of interest among shareholders, oversight by multiple large, non-related shareholders (balanced ownership concentration) becomes an important governance mechanism.