Dr. San Martín-Mosqueira, Pablo

Improvements in transparency at the country level have modified the relevance of bank debt maturity as a control mechanism. The novelty of this research is that we provide empirical evidence that the maturity of bank borrowing is contingent on the characteristics of the regulatory and the institutional setting about corporate governance. The main implication of our paper is that corporate governance rules have greater influence in civil-law countries than in common-law countries in promoting efficiency in the use of bank debt maturity. The value of this paper is that our results confirm that the implementation of similar regulations on transparency across countries with different legal systems favors the alignment of the role played by short-term bank debt in addressing asymmetric information, agency costs, and inefficient liquidation.

From a corporate governance point of view, this paper addresses the question of how corporate ownership and board characteristics influence firm value for a sample of Ibero-American companies. Specifically, we analyse indexed non-financial companies from Chile and Spain for the period 2007 – 2016, using the GMM panel data technique. Our research is novel in considering a two-country approach, with one emerging and one developed country, and in analysing how corporate ownership and board characteristics, in addition to contextual variables, determine firm value. Our results assess the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms. Although findings are intriguing regarding ownership concentration, they confirm the benefits of a good board of directors. This type of board is characterised by a large size, sufficiently independent directors, and a balance in terms of gender diversity. We provide several policy recommendations from our main findings.

From a corporate governance point of view, this paper addresses the question about how board gender diversity influences managerial opportunistic behavior for solving agency conflicts from a sample of European countries. Specifically, we analyzed indexed non-financial companies from Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom for the period 2006–2016. Several panel data techniques are used in the empirical analysis to deal with the endogeneity and heterogeneity problems. To the best of our knowledge our research is novel in the literature by providing a multi-country approach in board gender diversity, as well as considering contextual country variables and the role of the regulatory system as determinants of earnings management. Our results confirm the benefits of having a balanced board in terms of gender diversity. An equilibrated board tends to mitigate earnings management practices, reinforcing the value of the laws passed in recent decades in Europe. Our analysis reveals that the regulatory framework regarding board gender diversity established by each country has a determinant role in reaching equality in decision-making positions, as a founding value of the European Union. We provide several policy recommendations from our main findings.

Using a sample of 595 firms listed in the capital markets of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru for the period of 2000---2015, we confirm prior literature by showing that when power distribution among several large shareholders (contestability) increases, firms’ financial performance is enhanced. More interestingly, we find that these relations are even more significant in family-owned firms, emphasising the relevance of contesting control in this kind of firm. Furthermore, contestability has a greater influence in family firms that have the most concentrated ownership. We also find that the legal framework attenuates the impact of the balance of ownership. Here, contesting control acts as an internal corporate governance mechanism that provides an alternative to the external legal setting. Taken together, our results mean that in institutional settings characterised by weak investor protection and possible conflicts of interest among shareholders, oversight by multiple large, non-related shareholders (balanced ownership concentration) becomes an important governance mechanism.