Dr. San Martín-Mosqueira, Pablo

Antecedentes: El uso de instrumentos derivados como política corporativa de cobertura de riesgos financieros genera un impacto positivo en el valor de la empresa. Sin embargo, en países caracterizados por una débil protección legal al inversionista y alta concentración de la propiedad, como es el caso de Chile, los accionistas mayoritarios pudiesen utilizar esta política para extraer riqueza a los accionistas minoritarios. Método: Haciendo uso del Método Generalizado de los Momentos (GMM), este trabajo analiza un panel de 133 empresas no financieras que cotizan en la Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago de Chile, entre los años 2008 y 2013. Resultados: Los resultados indican una relación positiva y estadísticamente significativa entre el uso de instrumentos derivados y valor de la empresa. No obstante, esta evidencia se condiciona cuando el(los) principal(es) accionista(s) posee(n) el control de la compañía. Si el accionista principal o los tres accionistas más importantes concentran más de 67% de la propiedad, entonces la relación entre monto de derivados utilizados y valor de la firma es negativa. Conclusiones: Al analizar la dinámica entre la concentración de la propiedad y el uso de instrumentos derivados, encontramos que el principal y los tres accionistas más importantes, al alcanzar la súper mayoría de votos, utilizan los derivados para resguardar su propia riqueza, estrategia que es valorada negativamente por el mercado y que entrega evidencia en favor de la hipótesis de redistribución de riqueza entre los accionistas controladores y los minoritarios.

This study analyzes the zero-debt decisions of BRICS firms using a bivariate probit model. The leading hypotheses are financial flexibility and financial constraints. On the demand-side, our findings reveal that managerial debt aversion, early lifecycle stage, growth opportunities, solvency, and concentrated ownership contribute to the lack of debt. Similarly, a country's institutional quality correlates with firms' debt-free status. On the supply-side, creditors fund companies with poor financial records in countries with robust markets and economic freedom. Financial flexibility and restrictions leading to zero debt are linked to firm and institutional characteristics in emerging countries.

Este artículo analiza empíricamente la influencia de las Administradoras de Fondos de Pensión (AFP) como principales accionistas institucionales, sobre las decisiones de estructura de capital de la empresa chilena. Estos inversionistas pueden influir en la estructura de capital mediante distintos papeles como los de monitoreo a la gestión y de recopilación y transferencia de información al mercado. El análisis es desarrollado durante el periodo 2009-2011 para una muestra de 109 empresas chilenas que cotizan en la bolsa. Las AFP no sólo participan en el mercado accionario sino que también compiten por la deuda pública, por lo que nuestros resultados son relevantes al indicar la positiva influencia de este tipo de inversionistas en la contratación y emisión de deuda, particularmente la pública.

Improvements in transparency at the country level have modified the relevance of bank debt maturity as a control mechanism. The novelty of this research is that we provide empirical evidence that the maturity of bank borrowing is contingent on the characteristics of the regulatory and the institutional setting about corporate governance. The main implication of our paper is that corporate governance rules have greater influence in civil-law countries than in common-law countries in promoting efficiency in the use of bank debt maturity. The value of this paper is that our results confirm that the implementation of similar regulations on transparency across countries with different legal systems favors the alignment of the role played by short-term bank debt in addressing asymmetric information, agency costs, and inefficient liquidation.

From a corporate governance point of view, this paper addresses the question of how corporate ownership and board characteristics influence firm value for a sample of Ibero-American companies. Specifically, we analyse indexed non-financial companies from Chile and Spain for the period 2007 – 2016, using the GMM panel data technique. Our research is novel in considering a two-country approach, with one emerging and one developed country, and in analysing how corporate ownership and board characteristics, in addition to contextual variables, determine firm value. Our results assess the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms. Although findings are intriguing regarding ownership concentration, they confirm the benefits of a good board of directors. This type of board is characterised by a large size, sufficiently independent directors, and a balance in terms of gender diversity. We provide several policy recommendations from our main findings.

From a corporate governance point of view, this paper addresses the question about how board gender diversity influences managerial opportunistic behavior for solving agency conflicts from a sample of European countries. Specifically, we analyzed indexed non-financial companies from Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom for the period 2006–2016. Several panel data techniques are used in the empirical analysis to deal with the endogeneity and heterogeneity problems. To the best of our knowledge our research is novel in the literature by providing a multi-country approach in board gender diversity, as well as considering contextual country variables and the role of the regulatory system as determinants of earnings management. Our results confirm the benefits of having a balanced board in terms of gender diversity. An equilibrated board tends to mitigate earnings management practices, reinforcing the value of the laws passed in recent decades in Europe. Our analysis reveals that the regulatory framework regarding board gender diversity established by each country has a determinant role in reaching equality in decision-making positions, as a founding value of the European Union. We provide several policy recommendations from our main findings.

Using a unique, hand-collected data sample and panel-data econometric techniques, we analyse the impact of founding-family control and intergenerational succession on the value of Chilean listed companies. After controlling for firm- and ownership-specific characteristics, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between a founding family’s degree of ownership and firm value. Hence, family ownership at first increases firm value. However, when family ownership exceeds a threshold of about 38 percent of outstanding shares, the family takes advantage of its power in the firm and extracts wealth from minority shareholders. Further, if the founder of the company is the CEO or chairman of the board, firm value increases. However, family businesses with a subsequent-generation owner-manager destroy value.

This paper seeks to shed further light on the capital budgeting techniques used by Spanish companies. Our paper posits that the gap between theory and practice might be related to the nature of sources of value and to the efficiency of mechanisms aligning managerial and shareholder incentives, rather than to resource restrictions or model misinterpretation. We analyze data from a survey conducted in 2011, the final sample comprising 140 non-financial Spanish firms. Our findings show a behaviour pattern similar to that reported in prior research for firms in other countries. Particularly noteworthy is that payback appears to be the most widely used tool, while real options are used relatively little. Our results confirm that size and industry are related to the frequency of use of certain capital budgeting techniques. Further, we find that the relevance of growth opportunities and flexibility is an important factor explaining the use of real options.

Using a sample of 595 firms listed in the capital markets of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru for the period of 2000---2015, we confirm prior literature by showing that when power distribution among several large shareholders (contestability) increases, firms’ financial performance is enhanced. More interestingly, we find that these relations are even more significant in family-owned firms, emphasising the relevance of contesting control in this kind of firm. Furthermore, contestability has a greater influence in family firms that have the most concentrated ownership. We also find that the legal framework attenuates the impact of the balance of ownership. Here, contesting control acts as an internal corporate governance mechanism that provides an alternative to the external legal setting. Taken together, our results mean that in institutional settings characterised by weak investor protection and possible conflicts of interest among shareholders, oversight by multiple large, non-related shareholders (balanced ownership concentration) becomes an important governance mechanism.