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A comment on "salaries or piece rates: on the endogenous matching of harvest workers and crops"

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cris.virtual.author-orcid0000-0002-4583-4266
cris.virtual.author-orcid#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
cris.virtual.departmentFacultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administrativas
cris.virtual.department#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
cris.virtualsource.author-orcid3d0b6d30-097d-40bb-aae7-1701f9a09122
cris.virtualsource.author-orcid#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
cris.virtualsource.department3d0b6d30-097d-40bb-aae7-1701f9a09122
cris.virtualsource.department#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
dc.contributor.authorPh.D. Martínez-Gorricho, Silvia
dc.contributor.authorSanchez-Villalba, Miguel
dc.date.accessioned2024-06-07T15:39:01Z
dc.date.available2024-06-07T15:39:01Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.abstractIn Kandilov and Vukina (2016), the authors conclude that -when agents differ in their ability and principals in the riskiness of their projects- negative assortative matching (NAM) always ensues in equilibrium: good-type (high-ability) agents always match with bad-type (high-risk) principals and vice-versa (p. 78 and 82). We prove that this conclusion is incorrect. We revisit their model and show that positive assortative matching (PAM) always holds in equilibrium by applying standard literature results.
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.ucsc.cl/handle/25022009/10493
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherEconomics Bulletin
dc.subjectIncentives
dc.subjectAbility
dc.subjectMatching
dc.subjectMoral hazard
dc.titleA comment on "salaries or piece rates: on the endogenous matching of harvest workers and crops"
dc.typeartículo
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.identifier.id93
oairecerif.author.affiliationFacultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administrativas
oairecerif.author.affiliation#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
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